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NOTE
THE SNAIL DARTER V. THE TENNESSEE VALLEY
AUTHORITY: IS THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
ENDANGERED?
If plaintiffs argument were taken to its logical extreme,
the [Endangered Species] Act would require a court to halt
impoundment of water behind a fully completed dam if an
endangered species were discovered in the river on the day
before such impoundment was scheduled to take place.'
It is conceivable that the welfare of an endangered spe-
cies may weigh more heavily upon the public conscience, as
expressed by the final will of Congress, than the writeoff of
those millions of dollars already expended for Tellico in ex-
cess of its present salvageable value.'
INTRODUCTION
The realization that numerous animal and plant species
have become extinct because of human involvement with the
environment has prompted increasing concern about the pro-
tection of endangered species. Natural selection is a slow pro-
cess; species adapt to changes in their environments, evolving,
appearing, and disappearing as their ecosystems change. How-
ever, the natural evolution of numerous species has been dis-
rupted since humans began tampering with the environment.'
Industrial development and rapid population growth through-
out the world have increased the negative effects on the envi-
ronment, through, for example, pollution and destruction of
native habitats. It has been estimated that two-thirds of all
extinct species became extinct in the twentieth century as a
I Hill v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 419 F. Supp. 753, 763 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'd,
549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 478 (1977) [Subsequent citations
to the Tennessee Valley Authority will be abbreviated TVA].
2 Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064, 1074 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 478
(1977).
For example, the development of agriculture has resulted in the replacement of
natural ecosystems composed of numerous plant and animal species with ecosystems
limited to a few selected species.
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result of human activities.4 It has been calculated that the rate
of extinction has increased to approximately one species each
year.
These losses of species are not abstract events; they have
repercussions for all things having any contact with the natural
world. The continuation of the various species contributes to
the maintenance of the "balance of nature" within specific
environments.' The existence of these species guarantees a var-
ied gene pool which is necessary for scientific research. 7
As the number of extinct species has increased, many peo-
ple have expressed a desire that threatened species be saved
through a concerted effort. As a result, Congress determined
that legislation was needed to preserve the variety of living
species. Its attempts at legislating such protection culminated
in the Endangered Species Act of 1973.8
This note focuses on litigation and possible relief under
section 7 of the Act, using primarily the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority's (TVA's) confrontation with the three-inch snail darter
at the Tellico Dam project in Hill v. TVA.I Not all applications
of the Endangered Species Act are of such magnitude; the sub-
stantial assets committed to this project and the relative ob-
scurity of the snail darter are combining to create pressure for
I Wood, Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973: A Significant Restric-
tion for All Federal Activities, 5 ENVrr'L L. REP. 50,189, at 50,191 (1975).
' SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, REPORT ON THE ENDANGERED SPECIES Acr OF 1973,
S. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [19731 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2989 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
'Id.
Id. See Wood, supra note 4, at 50,191. See also HOUSE COMM. ON MERCHANT
MARINE AND FISHERIES, ENDANGERED AND THREATENED SPECIES CONSERVATION Aar OF
1973, H.R. REP. No. 412, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE
REPORT]:
(I]t is in the best interest of mankind to minimize the losses of genetic
variations. . . . [T]hey are potential resources. They are keys to puzzles we
cannot solve, and may provide answers to questions we have not yet learned
to ask.
. . [Siheer self-interest impels us to be cautious.
Id.
See also notes 207-08 and accompanying text infra regarding the "importance" of
particular species in nature.
'16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976).
419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'd, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977), cert.
granted, 98 S. Ct. 478 (1977).
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legislative or judicial relief, either of which would undermine
the purposes of the Act. In addition, the Hill controversy in-
volves both the Endangered Species Act and the National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA),' affording an oppor-
tunity to compare the two statutes.
I. TELLICO DAM LITIGATION
The Tellico project includes a dam near the mouth of the
Little Tennessee River, a navigable canal between the Tellico
Reservoir and Ft. Loudon Reservoir on the Tennessee River,
and a navigable channel extending thirty miles up the Little
Tennessee River." The dam, a concrete and earthfill structure,
would impound the Little Tennessee River and create a reser-
voir thirty-three miles long. 2
In 1966, the first funds for the project were appropriated
by Congress and authorization was given by the TVA. TVA's
plans included acquiring 38,000 acres of land, including 16,500
acres of river bottomland to be flooded. The remaining area
was to be used for industrial, recreational, residential, and
commercial development, including a proposed community of
50,000.' 3
Construction of the dam began in 1967; by 1969 the con-
crete part of the dam was complete and relocation of roads and
construction of bridges had started. By January 1970, the effec-
tive date of NEPA, about one-third of the entire project was
' 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806, 808 (E.D. Tenn.),
affl'd, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972).
One of the stated purposes of the TVA is "to control the destructive flood waters
in the Tennessee River . . .[Basin]." 16 U.S.C. § 831 (1976) (The Tennessee Valley
Authority Act of 1933). The TVA "is a wholly owned corporate agency and instrumen-
tality of the United States." United States ex rel. TVA v. An Easement and Right-of-
Way over Two Tracts of Land, 246 F. Supp. 263, 266 (W.D. Ky. 1965), affl'd, 375 F.2d
120 (6th Cir. 1967).
Under the TVA Act, the agency has an enumerated power to build "dams, and
reservoirs, in the Tennessee River and its tributaries, .... [which] will best serve to
...control destructive flood waters in the Tennessee . . . River drainage [basin]."
16 U.S.C. § 831c 0) (1976).
" Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164, 1169 (6th Cir. 1972).
, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 339 F.Supp. 806, 808 (E.D. Tenn.),
aff'd, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972). See text accompanying note 29 infra for TVA's
proposed uses of the Tellico Dam area.
19771
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finished. 4 In 1971, the TVA submitted a "draft" environmen-
tal impact statement with the Council on Environmental Qual-
ity.' 5
Litigation involving the Tellico Dam and Reservoir project
began in 1972 when a preliminary injunction was sought to stop
construction of the dam and associated activities. It was con-
tended that the TVA had not filed an adequate environmental
impact statement as required by NEPA.'5 The TVA argued
that section 102 (2)(C) of NEPA did not apply because the
project was started before the effective date of NEPA. The
District Court of the Eastern District of Tennessee held that
NEPA did apply to the Tellico Dam project because TVA re-
ceives annual appropriations from Congress and because
NEPA has been interpreted to apply to federal actions which
were started before it was enacted.'7 The court granted the
injunction against further work on the dam and reservoir until
TVA submitted an acceptable environmental impact state-
ment. ,8 The statement was inadequate because "although com-
prehensive in scope, the draft statement's cost-benefit analysis
consists almost entirely of unsupported conclusions."'' 9 The
court faulted the TVA for not considering the long-range im-
pact of the Tellico project on the environment in the area."0
In December 1972, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the district court's decision that the injunction against
* 468 F.2d at 1170.
* 339 F. Supp. at 808.
,* Id. at 806. The plaintiffs included the Environmental Defense Fund, Trout
Unlimited, Association for the Preservation of the Little T, and an individual
landowner of affected property. See text accompanying notes 41-42 infra for a discus-
sion of the requirements of the environmental impact statement.
,7 339 F. Supp. at 811.
" Id. at 812. The court did permit the continuation of some road construction and
mapping which did not threaten the environment. At the time of the case, the court
noted that $29 million of the estimated $69 million cost of the project had been spent
and about two-thirds of the property had been purchased. Id. at 808. The original
estimated cost was $42.5 million. 468 F.2d at 1170.
" 339 F. Supp. at 809. TVA's estimated cost-benefit ratio at this time was 1:3.
Id. However, according to the court of appeals, TVA's original cost-benefit ratio was
just 1:1.4. 468 F.2d at 1169.
" 339 F.Supp. at 809. In December 1971, the Governor of Tennessee also criticized
TVA's impact statement and suggested that the project be discontinued. The TVA
replied to the remarks, citing economic benefits of the dam, while downplaying envi-
ronmental concerns. Id. at 809-10.
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the TVA was proper.2' The court held that the Tellico Project
was subject to the requirements of section 102 (2)(C) of NEPA
and that the TVA was required to file an environmental impact
statement before it could continue working on the project."
However, the court stated that it would not decide the ques-
tions of the "advisability of proceeding with the project" and
"whether plaintiffs may challenge, under the NEPA, the ulti-
mate decision to proceed."'
The action against TVA continued in 1973 with a trial on
the merits in the district court. The court dissolved the prelimi-
nary injunction it earlier had imposed.24 The plaintiffs argued
that the TVA's environmental impact statement failed to ade-
quately analyze the total impact of the project2 and failed to
discuss alternatives to the project in any detail. 26 However, the
court held that TVA had complied with NEPA in its impact
statement and could continue with the construction of the Tel-
lico Dam.27 The Sixth Circuit affirmed this decision in Febru-
ary of 1974, stating that the TVA had complied with the re-
quirements of NEPA.5
This litigation under NEPA balanced the benefits of the
project against its harm to society. As conceived by the TVA,
the Tellico project is a multi-purpose plan to "develop naviga-
tion; control destructive floods; generate electric power; pro-
vide water supply; promote recreation, fish and wildlife use,
and shoreline development; create new job opportunities; ad-
vance industrial development; and foster improved economic
conditions' ' 2 in a three-county area of eastern Tennessee."
1, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972).
" Id. at 1180-81.
" Id. at 1181.
24 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn.
1973), affl'd, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974). At this time, TVA had spent about $35
million of the estimated cost of $69 million. Id. at 1006.
2 371 F. Supp. 1004. Plaintiffs contended the statement should have discussed
historical sites, family relocation, ecology, water quality, shoreline development, and
economy.
1 Id. at 1011-12. See notes 59-61 and accompanying text infra on application of
NEPA to the Tellico Dam.
21 Id. at 1015. See text accompanying notes 49-58 infra for a discussion of the
application of NEPA by other courts.
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974).
Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 2-3, Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977).
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806, 807 (E.D. Tenn.
1972), aff'd, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972).
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However, the dam would destroy the relatively untouched,
free-flowing character of the Little Tennessee River. A number
of important historical and archaeological sites would be de-
stroyed,3' valuable farm land would be lost, and development
might adversely affect the local environment.32 The district
court noted that "the free-flowing river is the likely habitat of
one or more of 7 rare or endangered fish species. '33
The snail darter was discovered on August 12, 1973, in a
seventeen-mile stretch of the Little Tennessee River, and was
placed on the endangered species list on November 10, 1975,
because construction of the Tellico Dam would destroy nearly
all of the darter's habitat.3 4 Thus, the conflict over the Tellico
project again went to the courts in 1976;35 this time the question
was the applicability of the Endangered Species Act of 1973.31
The district court found that completion of the Tellico
Dam and impoundment of the Little Tennessee River would
"jeopardize the continued existence of the snail darter,"3 but
concluded that the project should be finished since it was sub-
stantially completed. "At some point in time a federal project
becomes so near completion and so incapable of modification
that a court of equity should not apply a statute enacted long
after inception of the project to produce an unreasonable re-
sult." 3
1, Id. at 808.
32 Id.
3 Id. Critics of the Tellico project have pointed out that the dam would only
provide "one tenth of one percent of the electricity within the TVA system" and that
the dam would add "only 1.3 percent to the water storage above Chattanooga." In
addition, the plans for a 30,000-person model community, which was going to be built
near the dam, were dropped by its builder, Boeing Corporation. Critics also discount
TVA's estimate that the dam would provide $1.44 million each year in recreational
benefits because of the number of lakes in the area and because one of the river's main
attractions is trout fishing, which would disappear if the dam were closed. Stevens,
Little Fish, Big Dam: Issue up to Congress, Louisville Courier-Journal & Times, Mar.
20, 1977, § D, at 6, col. 1 (state ed.).
31 Hill v. TVA, 419 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'd, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir.
1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 478 (1977).
See notes 142-49 and accompanying text infra for discussion of the application of
regulations under the Endangered Species Act to the snail darter, and TVA's objec-
tions.
419 F. Supp. 753.
36 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976). The Act was passed by Congress on December
28, 1973.
37 419 F. Supp. at 757.
11 Id. at 760. At the time of this suit, the dam was about 85% complete, and the
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The Sixth Circuit, on January 31, 1977, reversed, 9 holding
that the completion of the dam would violate the Endangered
Species Act and that the TVA could not be exempted from
compliance by the courts. In effect, it stated that the courts do
not have wide discretion in determining whether the Act should
apply to an endangered species."
I. THE PROVISIONS AND PURPOSES OF NEPA
Because the Tellico controversy has been litigated with
respect to both NEPA and the Endangered Species Act, it is
instructive to discuss briefly the requirements and philosophy
of NEPA to determine why different results occurred when the
two acts were each applied to the dispute.
NEPA requires all federal agencies to draft an environ-
mental impact statement for "every recommendation or report
on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment."4' This statement must include, among other things,
information about the "environmental impact of the proposed
action," unavoidable adverse environmental effects of the pro-
ject, and alternatives to it.42
The purposes of NEPA emphasize the relation of environ-
mental protection to human welfare and the need to protect the
nation's resources.43 Congress, by enacting NEPA, has declared
that environmental concerns must be considered along with the
other aspects of our industrial society in future planning and
that environmental quality must be restored and maintained.44
To carry out the policies of NEPA, federal laws and regulations
are to be interpreted in light of this act,45 and all federal agen-
entire project was 80% complete. Further, $78 million had been invested in the project;
the TVA estimated that $53 million would be lost if the project were stopped. Id. at
759.
"' Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977).
0 Id. See text accompanying notes 151-62 infra for a discussion of the court's
discretion in applying section 7 of the Endangered Species Act.
" 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). See Seeley, The National Environmental Policy
Act: A Guideline for Compliance, 26 VAND. L. REv. 295 (1973).
,2 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (i)(iii) (1970). Copies of the environmental impact state-
ment go through the process of agency review. Id. at (2)(C).
' Id. § 4321. See note 206 infra for the policies underlying NEPA.
" Id. § 4331.
' Id. § 4332(1).
1977]
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cies are required to consider environmental factors along with
technical and economic aspects in their decision making."
Congress, through NEPA, has made environmental protection
a national priority to be balanced with other priorities in our
society. "In some instances environmental costs outweigh eco-
nomic and technical benefits and in other instances they may
not. But NEPA mandates a rather finely tuned and
'systematic' balancing analysis in each instance."4
Cases decided under NEPA have applied this balancing
test to determine whether a particular federal agency complied
with the environmental impact statement requirement "to the
fullest extent possible."4 In Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Com-
mittee, Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy Commission49 the
District of Columbia Circuit said that "the general substantive
policy of the Act is a flexible one,"50 yet the procedural require-
ments of preparing an environmental impact statement under
NEPA are stringent. It concluded that a "case-by-case balanc-
ing judgment"5 is required for every federal action subject to
NEPA. In Arlington Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe5" the
Fourth Circuit, holding that NEPA applied to the construction
of Interstate 66 in Arlington County, Virginia, stated that the
Secretary of Transportation must consider all the information
in the impact statement including the previous investment in
the project.5 3 The Eighth Circuit in Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers" accepted the defendant's
environmental impact statement on the Gillham Dam in Ar-
kansas. The court concluded that the impact statement was
not biased, that it did consider reasonable alternatives to the
" Id. § 4332(2)(A)-(B).
,' Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy
Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
,1 This is what is required in the statute, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Id. at 1123.
I1 d.
52 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972).
Id. at 1332-33.
54 470 F.2d 289 (8thCir. 1972). The intent of NEPA, according to the court, is that
the agencies seriously consider environmental effects which are included in their envi-
ronmental impact statements. Review by the courts includes deciding whether the
agency acted within the scope of its authority and whether the action was arbitrary or
capricious. Id. at 300. See notes 155-58 and accompanying text infra on judicial review
of federal agency action.
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dam, and that it contained a full disclosure of facts relevant to
the project.5 As a result, a temporary injunction was dismissed
and the dam could be completed. The same court in
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke5 rejected the
Corps' impact statement on the Cache River-Bayou DeView
project because it did not discuss alternatives, was too vague,
and lacked supporting evidence.17 The Eighth Circuit again, in
Sierra Club v. Froehlke,"8 held that the Corps' impact state-
ment for the Meramec Dam was adequate. The statement in-
corporated a discussion of alternatives and a consideration of
the consequences of the dam on the Indiana bat.
The Tellico controversy initially focused on the applica-
bility of NEPA. After deciding NEPA applied to the contro-
versy, the court enjoined TVA from further construction be-
cause of the inadequacy of its impact statement. The injunc-
tion was later dissolved when its environmental impact state-
ment complied with section 102 (2)(C) of NEPA.5 9 The state-
ment presented economic, social, and environmental conse-
quences of the dam and possible alternatives. It contained
agency and individual comments and was appropriately filed
with the Council on Environmental Quality."0 The court con-
cluded that "[t]here has been on the part of TVA in reaching
its decision a good faith consideration and balancing of envi-
ronmental factors. . . the actual balance of costs and benefits
struck was not arbitrary and gave sufficient weight to environ-
mental values."'"
Work was again halted as a result of litigation under the
Endangered Species Act. This Act does not contemplate a bal-
ancing approach, but requires mandatory action by federal
0 470 F.2d 289.
5, 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972). The channelization project is in Arkansas and
Mississippi.
Id. at 348.
534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976).
5, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn.
1973), aff'd, 492 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1974). See notes 24-28 and accompanying text supra;
for details of TVA's environmental impact statement. TVA's final environmental im-
pact statement consisted of approximately 600 pages.
60 371 F. Supp. 1004. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). The establishment and
duties of the Council on Environmental Quality are covered in 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-4347
(1970 & Supp. V 1975) (Subchapter H of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969).
," 371 F. Supp. at 1015.
1977]
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agencies to ensure the protection of endangered and threatened
species. 2
11. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT OF 1973
A. Background of Endangered Species Act: Earlier Federal
Legislation
The Endangered Species Act" was passed by Congress in
1973 as a successor to earlier federal acts which dealt with
endangered species. Among the earliest federal legislation pro-
tecting wildlife was the Lacey Act,64 passed in 1900. The act
prohibited the importation into the United States of certain
animals which the Secretary of the Interior determined would
be harmful to "human beings, . the interests of agriculture,
horticulture, forestry or to wildlife or the wildlife resources of
the United States."65 In addition the act, as amended, prohib-
ited transporting in interstate commerce animals taken in vio-
lation of state and federal laws and required animals to be
shipped under humane conditions. 6 The major weakness of
this act was that it depended to a large extent on state and
foreign laws, rather than on a federal program, for the protec-
tion of endangered species.
Federal legislation aimed at protecting particular species
included the Black Bass Act of 1926,65 the Migratory Bird Con-
servation Act of 1929,9 and the Bald Eagle Protection Act of
1940.7 Legislation protecting endangered species in general
12 See notes 89, 190 and accompanying text infra for the purposes of the Endan-
gered Species Act.
63 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976).
18 U.S.C. §§ 41-44 (1976); 16 U.S.C. 33 667(e), 701 (1976).
18 U.S.C. § 42(a)(1) (1976). See Comment, Vanishing Wildlife and Federal
Protective Efforts, 1 ECOLOGY L.Q. 520, 537 (1971)..
U1 Coggins, Conserving Wildlife Resources: An Overview of the Endangered Spe-
cies Act of 1973, 51 N.D.L. Rav. 315, 317 (1974); Palmer, Endangered Species Protec-
tion: A History of Congressional Action, 4 ENV'L Are. 255, 256-57 (1975).
67 Palmer, supra note 66, at 258.
16 U.S.C. §§ 851-856 (1976).
" 16 U.S.C. §§ 715-715r (1976). This act provides for federal purchase or rental
of lands and waters for migratory bird sanctuaries.
70 16 U.S.C. § 668d. Articles dealing with the history of federal environmental
legislation in the United States include the following: Coggins, supra note 66; Palmer,
supra note 66; Note, Federal Protection of Endangered Wildlife Species, 22 STAN. L.
REv. 1289 (1970); Comment, supra note 65.
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dates from the Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966.1'
This was the first attempt by the federal government to protect
all native endangered species of fauna. The purposes of the act
were to:
provide for a program for the conservation, protection, res-
toration, and propagation of selected species of native fish
and wildlife, including migratory birds, that are threatened
with extinction, and to consolidate, restate, and modify the
present authorities relating to administration by the Secre-
tary of the Interior of the National Wildlife Refuge System.72
The Secretary of the Interior had authority to establish
and carry out programs as well as to encourage other federal
agencies to further the purposes of the act.73 The act was criti-
cized for neglecting causes of extinction other than destruction
of habitat and for limiting itself to native wildlife .7 Further-
more, other federal agencies did not have a mandatory obliga-
tion to protect endangered species.
In an effort to strengthen federal protection of endangered
species, Congress enacted the Endangered Species Conserva-
tion Act of 1969 which amended the 1966 act.75 The new act
covered several significant areas. First, authority was given to
the Secretary of the Interior to develop a list of endangered
animal species and subspecies which could not be imported
into the United States." There were two limited exceptions:
1, Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (1966). This act was originally codified at 16
U.S.C. § 668aa-668ee. §§ 668 cc(1-6) were added by amendment in 1969. All of the
act except 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd-668ee (1976), governing the National Wildlife Refuge
System, was repealed in 1973.
72 Pub. L. No. 89-669, § 1(a), 80 Stat. 926 (1966), quoted in Palmer, supra note
66, at 258-59.
1 Palmer, supra note 66, at 259, 287 n.46; See SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 2.
74 Palmer, supra note 66, at 259, 262.
11 16 U.S.C. § 668aa to 668cc-6 (1969) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 91-135,
83 Stat. 275, and repealed by the present act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1973)).
1, The prohibition extended to not simply the animals, but also to any part,
product, or egg of such endangered animal. The covered animals included all verte-
brates and two classes of invertebrates. SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 2; Palmer,
supra note 66, at 262; Comment, supra note 65, at 547.
The 1969 act also directed the Secretary of the Interior to seek an international
meeting on endangered fish and wilflife. This resulted in the Convention on Interna-
tional Trade in Endangered Wild Fauna and Flora in 1973. A result of this meeting,
according to Palmer, was the enactment of the Endangered Species Act in 1973. Pal-
mer supra note 66, at 263-65.
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permits could be obtained to import endangered animals for
use in "scientific, educational, zoological or propagational pur-
poses"77 and to commercially import animals pursuant to a pre-
existing contract for the period of one year following the ani-
mal's placement on the endangered species list.71 Second, to
protect domestically endangered species, the act made it illegal
for persons in the United States to buy or sell such species if
the persons "[know], or in the exercise of due care should
know, that such animal was taken in any manner in violation
of the laws or regulations of a state or foreign country."7 The
Lacey Act was also expanded to include a larger number of
protected animals."0 Third, more money was appropriated for
the Secretary of the Interior's acquisition of land to protect
endangered species.8 '
Several weaknesses existed in the 1969 act. The Secretary
of the Interior had problems implementing parts of the pro-
gram; the Secretary also could not act to protect species until
they became so endangered that their chances for survival were
minimal.82 In addition, the fifteen million dollars appropriated
for land acquisition were spent by 1973.83 Finally, the 1969 act,
like the 1966 act, did not protect plants.
B. Provisions of the Act
Finding that the 1966 and 1969 acts were not sufficient
protection for endangered species, Congress in 1973 passed the
Endangered Species Act" which replaced the 1969 act and the
" SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 2. See Palmer, supra note 66, at 262; Comment,
supra note 65, at 553.
"' SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 2. See Palmer, supra note 66, at 263; Comment,
supra note 65, at 552. The purpose of this exception was to avoid economic hardship.
' SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 2.
" Palmer, supra note 66, at 265.
' Id. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 3; Comment, supra note 65, at 546.
Palmer, supra note 66, at 263; SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 3. Other weak-
nesses are:
No protection is afforded endangered species while still wild; no protection
is given against continued destruction within a state; and no pressure is
placed upon the states to declare the hunting or other taking of endangered
species contrary to state law in order to give effect to the purpose of the Act.
Note, supra note 70, at 1306.
93 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 2. See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 4.
$1 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1976). Articles on the 1973 Act include the following:
Lachenmeier, The Endangered Species Act of 1973: Preservation or Pandemonium?,
[Vol. 66
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1966 act with the exception of provisions concerning the Na-
tional Wildlife Refuge System.8 To improve upon the earlier
acts, the Senate felt that new legislation must provide that
threatened as well as endangered species be protected, that
more money be authorized for acquisition of land, and that
state agencies provide protection programs for endangered
species.86
1. General Provisions of the Act
Section 2 of the Endangered Species Act sets out congres-
sional findings and policy. 87 Congress finds that there are var-
ious endangered and threatened species in the United States
which are of "esthetic, ecological, educational, historical, rec-
reational and scientific value to the Nation and its people"88
and which should be conserved. The purpose of the 1973 Act is
to provide a means to save such species and their ecosystems;"
federal departments and agencies are to further the purposes
of the Act.9
Definitions used in the Act are set out in section 3.11 The
definition of "conservation" is a broad one, encompassing "the
use of all methods and procedures which are necessary to bring
any endangered species or threatened species to the point at
which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no
longer necessary."92 An endangered species is "any species
5 ENvr'L L. 29 (1974); Wood, supra note 4, at 50,189; Note, Obligations of Federal
Agencies under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 28 STAN. L. REV. 1247
(1976). See also Palmer, supra note 66.
Legislative history includes: Endangered Species Act of 1973: Hearings on S. 1592
and S. 1983 Before the Subcomm. on Environment of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
Endangered Species: Hearings on H.R. 37 et al. Before the Subcomm.; on Fisheries
and Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) [hereinafter cited as House
Hearings].
" Palmer, supra note 66, at 268.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 3.
16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1976). Section 1 of the Senate bill sets out the title. S. 1983,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1973).
U 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3) (1976).
" Id. § 1531(b).
" Id. § 1531(c).
, Id. § 1532.
" Id. § 1532(2).
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which is in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant
portion of its range. '9 3 A threatened species is "any species
which is likely to become an endangered species within the
foreseeable future throughout all or a significant portion of its
range."94 The addition of the "threatened" species category
allows the Secretary of the Interior to provide for protection of
species before they become virtually extinct; it gives a certain
amount of discretion to the Secretary to find whether "a mea-
surable risk to those species could be said to exist."95
Under the 1973 Act "species" includes fish or wildlife and
plants. The definition of "species" provides broader coverage
than that provided by the 1969 act. "Fish or wildlife" includes
"any member of the animal kingdom" 9 and encompasses cap-
tive and domestic animals 7 as well as wild ones. Also, plants
were not protected in earlier legislation. The Act extends to
subspecies and other "smaller taxa."9 The effect of including
subspecies and "smaller taxa" as categories is to allow for the
protection of a population even if the entire species is not en-
dangered or threatened.'
93 Id. § 1532(4). The Act does exclude species of the class Insecta which are deter-
mined to be pests, providing great risks to humans. This definition of "endangered"
species is more inclusive than the use of the term in the 1969 act. Under the 1973 act,
species are protected if their existence is threatened in all or "a significant" portion of
their range, whereas in the earlier act species which are "threatened with worldwide
extinction" are protected. Pub. L. No. 91-135, § 3(a), 83 Stat. 275 (repealed 1973).
"This definition is a significant shift in the definition in existing law, which considers
a species to be endangered only when it is threatened with world-wide extinction."
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 10. Now, if a species is in danger of extinction in one
range but not in another, it can be protected. See Wood, supra note 4, at 50,190.
16 U.S.C. § 1532(15)(1976).
, HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 11. See also House Hearings, supra note 84, at
284-85 (statement by Rep. B. Blackburn); Senate Hearings, supra note 84, at 76 (state-
ment by E. U. Curtis Bohlen); Palmer, supra note 66, at 269; Note, supra note 84, at
1250.
For both endangered and threatened species, the Secretary will have flexibility in
deciding where species are to be protected, but the question remains of what a
"significant portion of its range" means. Lachenmeier, supra note 84, at 36, 41.
16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(1976). The 1969 act included "any wild mammal, fish, wild
bird, amphibian, reptile, mollusk, or crustacean." Pub. L. No. 91-135, § 1(2), 83 Stat.
275 (repealed 1973).
1' Lachenmeier, supra note 84, at 37-38.
Is 16 U.S.C. § 1532(9)(1976). "Plants" are defined as "any member of the plant
kingdom, including seeds, roots and other parts thereof"
16 U.S.C. § 1532(11)(1976).
' According to the House Report, the term "species" includes "any subspecies
...or any population of such species." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 11. For
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Finally, the "taking" of endangered fish and wildlife,
which is prohibited in section 9, is defined as "to harass, harm,
pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to
attempt to engage in any such conduct." ''
Section 4 establishes that the Secretary of the Interior, by
regulation, is to determine whether a species is endangered or
threatened. 0 2 The determination follows an analysis of scien-
tific and commercial data and consultation with interested
parties. Before any species can be considered endangered or
threatened, the Secretary publishes notice in the Federal Reg-
ister and allows ninety days for comments from states where
the species is a "resident."'' 03 Section 4 also provides for publi-
cation in the Federal Register of lists of all endangered and
threatened species and their geographic locations.' 4
example, American alligators are endangered in some areas and threatened in others.
Note, supra note 84, at 1250 n.29. The inclusion of "subspecies" as well as "species"
was made in the 1969 act, Pub. L. No. 91-135, § 3(a), 83 Stat. 275 (repealed 1973).
See also Senate Hearings, supra note 84, at 55, 85-86.
"1, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(14)(1976). The Senate report stated that taking should be
defined "in the broadest possible manner to include every conceivable way in which a
person can 'take' or attempt to 'take' any fish or wildlife." SENATE REPORT, supra note
5, at 7. The House report also indicated that the definition should be broad. HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 7, at 11.
Although during Senate and House hearings it was suggested that "taking" in-
cludes destruction or modification of habitat, this was not incorporated in the final bill.
See Senate Hearings, supra note 84, at 108, 129, 146; House Hearings, supra note 84,
at 299. See also Lachenmeier, supra note 84, at 38-41; Note, supra note 84, at 1251
n.31.
' 16 U.S.C. § 1533 (1976). See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 11-12; SENATE
REPORT, supra note 5, at 7-8. See notes 142-49 and accompanying text infra on applica-
tion of procedures to the snail darter.
"' 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1976). The five factors used in making these determina-
tions are: "curtailment of its habitat; over-utilization; disease or predation; inade-
quacy of other regulatory mechanisms; and other 'natural or other manmade factors
affecting its continued existence."' Id. § 1533(a)(1).
See Lachenmeier, supra note 84, at 44-45 for a discussion of "resident species";
SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 7.
201 16 U.S.C. § 1533(c)(1976). Before any species is placed on or taken off such
lists, the Secretary of the Interior must, if an interested person petitions under the
Administrative Procedure Act, review the supporting evidence. 16 U.S.C. §
1533(c)(1976). The Secretary has the discretion to make such review for public suits
on a finding that "such person has presented substantial evidence which in [the
Secretary's] judgment warrants such a review." Id. § 1533(c)(2). See Lachenmeier,
supra note 84, at 45.
Subsections 1533(d) and 1533(0 provide for the issuance of regulations protecting
such species; § 1533(e) provides for protecting species which "closely [resemble] in
appearance" an endangered or threatened species.
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Section 5 pertains to the authority of the Secretary of the
Interior to acquire property for the purpose of implementing
the Act."°5 Section 6 deals with federal cooperation with the
states.0 ' The Secretary has the authority to enter into a
"cooperative agreement" with any state that has an acceptable
conservation program; °7 any such state is entitled to federal
financial assistance. 10 8
Section 7, entitled "[i]nteragency cooperation," indicates
the roles of other federal departments and agencies with re-
spect to the protection of endangered and threatened species.
This was the primary section in issue in Hill v. TVA and is
discussed in further detail below. '
Section 8 authorizes financial assistance by the United
States to foreign countries for the purposes of encouraging con-
servation of endangered and threatened species.' 0 Illegal acts
under this Act are set out in Section 9.' In particular, it is
illegal to "take any such [endangered] species [of fish and
wildlife] within the United States."' 1 2 Section 10 provides for
See SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 7-8. Regulations promulgated under the
Endangered Species Act identify the endangered and threatened species of animals
and plants, the extent to which they are endangered or threatened, and the ranges of
these species. 50 C.F.R. Part 17 (1976). Subpart C of Part 17 pertains to endangered
wildlife and subpart D applies to threatened species. The List of Endangered and
Threatened Species is found at § 17.11.
10S 16 U.S.C. § 1534 (1976). The Secretary has authority to acquire "lands, waters,
or interests therein." Id. § 1534(a)(1).
106 16 U.S.C. § 1535(a) (1976) provides that the Secretary of the Interior "shall
cooperate to the maximum extent practicable with the States." See CONF. REPORT ON
THE ENDANGERED SPEciES ACr OF 1973, H.R. REP. No. 740, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 25-
26 (1973), reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2989, 3001-08 [hereinafter
cited as CONF. REPORT]. See also HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 13-14; Lachenmeier,
supra note 84, at 50-54.
107 16 U.S.C. § 1535(c) (1976).
108 Id. § 1535(d).
,0I d. § 1536. See notes 118-27 and accompanying text infra for analysis of section
7 of the Endangered Species Act.
110 16 U.S.C. § 1537 (1976).
'" Id. § 1538. Prohibited acts are stated as are requirements for permits for "any
activity otherwise prohibited by the regulations" in 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.22, 17.32 (1976).
The permits are only available for stated purposes, "for scientific research or for en-
hancing propagations or survival" of endangered and threatened species and for
"economic hardship; or zoological exhibition; or educational purposes; or special pur-
poses consistent with the purposes of the Act" for threatened species. Id.
112 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B)(1976). It is also illegal to "possess, sell, carry, trans-
port or ship" any such illegally taken species. Id. § 1538(a)(1)(D). Subsection (a)(1)
deals with specified prohibited acts with respect to fish and wildlife, and (a)(2) with
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the Secretary of Interior to make exceptions to the prohibitions
set out in section 9.113
Penalties for violating the Endangered Species Act are
stated in section 11."1 Civil penalties up to $10,000 for each
violation are possible for any person "who knowingly violates,
or who knowingly commits an act in the course of commercial
activity which violates any provision of this chapter, or any
provision of any permit or certificate issued hereunder, or of
any regulation.""' Criminal penalties are established for willful
violations of the Act. 16
One important feature of the Act is the provision for citi-
zen suits, by which "any person may commence a civil suit on
his own behalf. . . to enjoin any person, including the United
States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency
.. .who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this
chapter.""' 7
2. Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act
Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act establishes the
responsibilities of federal agencies for the conservation of en-
dangered and threatened species. The section states:
The Secretary shall review other programs administered by
him and utilize such programs in furtherance of the purposes
respect to plants. This section also covers violations of the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora and unlawful imports and
exports of fish and wildlife and plants. See CONF. REPORT, supra note 106, at 27.
The meaning of the term "taking" is discussed in note 101 and accompanying text
supra.
,,3 16 U.S.C. § 1539 (1976). The Act does not apply to certain Alaskan natives who
take any endangered or threatened species "primarily for subsistence purposes." Id. §
1539(e). See note 111 supra for the regulations concerning permits.
'" 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (1976).
' Id. § 1540(a)(1). Persons who violate the Act unknowingly may be subject to a
fine of up to $1000. Usually, however, a person coming under this provision, such as a
casual tourist, would just forfeit the items concerned. CONF. REPORT, supra note 106,
at 28.
"' 16 U.S.C. § 1540(b)(1) (1976). Maximum penalties are $20,000 and one year
imprisonment for each violation. Jurisdiction over any actions arising under the Act
is in the United States district courts. Id. § 1540(c).
"I Id. § 1540(g)(1)(A).
There are also provisions in the Act for the Smithsonian Institution to establish a
list of endangered plants in § 1541. The Act is to be applied in conjunction with the
Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972. See § 1543. See § 1542 for authorization of
annual appropriations.
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of this chapter. All other Federal departments and agencies
shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the
Secretary, utilize their authorities in furtherance of the pur-
poses of this chapter by carrying out programs for the conser-
vation of endangered species and threatened species listed
pursuant to section 1533 of this title and by taking such ac-
tion necessary to insure that actions authorized, funded, or
carried out by them do not jeopardize the continued existence
of such endangered species and threatened species or result
in the destruction or modification of habitat of such species
which is determined by the Secretary, after consultation as
appropriate with the affected States, to be critical."'
The wording of this section makes it mandatory that fed-
eral agencies ensure the existence of such species and prevent
the destruction of critical habitats."' Federal departments and
agencies "shall . . .utilize their authorities in furtherance of
the purposes of this chapter."' 20
Legislative history confirms this interpretation of the stat-
ute. The Interior Department described the proposed Endan-
gered Species Conservation Act of 1972 at House hearings on
the 1973 Act as "the first piece of substantive law which agen-
cies would have to adhere to in carrying out their programs and
duties, as it would prevent them from taking action which
would jeopardize the continued existence of endangered spe-
cies."'' 2' At the Senate hearings, an Interior official stated that
,, Id. § 1536 (1976).
"' Id. The Fish and Wildlife Service, by regulation, has defined "critical habitat"
as "the entire habitat or any portion thereof, if, and only if, any constituent element
is necessary to the normal needs or survival of that species." 40 Fed. Reg. 17,764 (1975),
quoted in 41 Fed. Reg. 13,927 (1976). Several factors to be considered for the determi-
nation of critical habitat are included, as well as a definition of "habitat." Any action
by a federal agency which would destroy or modify a critical habitat would violate
section 7 if it "might be expected to result in a reduction in the numbers or distribution
of that species of sufficient magnitude to place the species in further jeopardy, or
restrict the potential and reasonable expansion or recovery of that species." 40 Fed.
Reg. 17,765 (1975), quoted in 41 Fed. Reg. 13,927 (1976).
There is a current controversy in Houston, Texas, on the issue of establishing
critical habitats for the Houston toad where commercial development would be lim-
ited. The areas in question have the proper environmental elements for the toad's
existence, but biologists have been unable to actually find any of the elusive animals.
NBC Weekend, Jan. 7, 1978.
,20 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976) (emphasis added).
121 House Hearings, supra note 84, at 188, cited in Note, supra note 84, at 1255.
This mandatory language is in contrast to that of the earlier acts; see notes 63-83 and
accompanying text supra for provisions of the earlier legislation.
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this section of the proposed Act "for the first time would pro-
hibit another Federal agency from taking action which does
jeopardize the status of endangered species. ' 122 In addition, the
House Report declares that section 7 "requires the Secretary
and the heads of all other Federal departments and agencies
to use their authorities in order to carry out programs for the
protection of endangered species." 123Representative Dingell,
reporting on the conference bill before the House of Represent-
atives, explained, "Another important step which we have
taken in this bill . . . is that we have substantially amplified
the obligation of both agencies [Commerce and Interior] and
other agencies of Government as well, to take steps within their
power to carry out the purposes of this act.' 1 24 Citing the prob-
lems associated with whooping cranes and grizzly bears, Din-
gell asserted that "every agency of Government is committed
to see that those purposes [of the Act] are carried out ...
[Tihe agencies of Government can no longer plead that they
can do nothing about [the extermination of a species]. They
can, and they must. The law is clear.' '2 5
The original text of section 7121 included the statement that
all federal departments and agencies "shall, in consultation
with and with the assistance of the Secretary-(a) carry out
such programs as are practicable for the protection of species
listed . . . as endangered or threatened.' 1 27 The bill as it was
In Senate Hearings, supra note 84, at 68.
" HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 14. The Senate report also states, "All agencies,
departments, and other instrumentalities of the Federal government are directed to
cooperate in the implementation of the goals of this Act." SENATE REPORT, supra note
5, at 8-9.
... 119 CONG. REc. 42913 (1973).
l" Id. House Bill 37 was introduced to the whole House and passed (391-12) on
September 18, 1973. 119 CONG. REC. 30157, 30167-68 (1973). The Conference Commit-
tee presented the Conference Report to the House on December 19, 1973. 119 CONG.
REc. 42621 (1973). The House agreed to the report the following day.
Senate Bill 1983 was considered by the entire Senate and passed (60-33) on July
24, 1973. 119 CONG. REc. 25662, 25691 (1973). The Conference Committee reported to
the Senate and the Senate agreed to the report on December 19, 1973. 119 CONG. REC.
42451, 42528 (1973).
See Note, supra note 84, at 1255.
121 This language was contained in Senate Bill S. 1983, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
'" 119 CONG. REc. 25664 (1973) (emphasis added). Similarly in the House, original
legislation included, in the policy sections, qualifying phrases when referring to the
roles of other federal agencies. For example, H.R. Rep. No. 37, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §
2(c)(1973) stated, "All Federal departments and agencies shall seek to protect species
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finally enacted omitted this qualifying phrase, a further indica-
tion that Congress did not intend the federal agencies to have
discretion in carrying out the provisions of the Endangered
Species Act.
C. Litigation Under the Endangered Species Act
Litigation under the Endangered Species Act has centered
on the application of the statute, particularly section 7, to pro-
jects undertaken by federal agencies. The nature of the relief
sought, the standard of judicial review, the role of the Depart-
ment of the Interior, and the mandatory duty imposed on the
federal agencies are major issues in these cases.
In National Wildlife Federation v. Colemanlss the plaintiff
sought to enjoin construction by the Department of Transpor-
tation of a 5.7 mile section of Interstate 10 which would pass
through the habitat of the Mississippi sandhill crane. At the
time of the litigation there were an estimated forty cranes in
existence. Their only natural habitat was a 40,000 acre region
in Mississippi,' 29 part of which was a proposed refuge area. The
crane was listed as an endangered subspecies in 1973; in 1975
its "critical habitat" designation was issued pursuant to an
emergency determination.' 31 In its decision to halt the con-
struction until modifications in the plans were made,' 3' the
... and wherever practicable, shall utilize their authorities in furtherance of the
purpose of this Act." House Hearings, supra note 84, at 89 (emphasis added). The
language in H.R. Rep. No. 4758, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(b) (1973) read: "in so far as
is practicable and consistent with the primary purposes of such bureaus, agencies and
services." House Hearings, supra note 84, at 166-67. The subcommittee counsel at the
hearings responded favorably to the suggestions by the Sierra Club that such language
be taken out. Id. at 345. These qualifying phrases were not included in the policy
section of H.R. 37 as reported to the whole House, nor are they in the Act as passed.
16 U.S.C. § 1531(c)(1976).
See SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 18-19; Note, supra note 84, at 1254 n.53.
'- 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976). Plaintiff sought relief
under the Endangered Species Act, NEPA, and the Department of Transportation Act.
Plaintiff, National Wildlife Federation, had standing to sue under 16 U.S.C. §
1540(g)(1) which provides for citizen suits. National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman,
400 F. Supp. 705, 710 (S.D. Miss. 1975). See text accompanying note 117 supra for a
discussion of citizen suits under the Endangered Species Act.
"1 529 F.2d at 362-63. The Mississippi sandhill crane is a subspecies of sandhill
crane.
,"I Id. at 367. The emergency designation was made the day before the trial
started, because of the threat created by the highway to the crane's habitat. Id. at 367-
68.
1' Id. at 375.
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court stated that section 7 imposes a mandatory duty on the
Department of Transportation not to jeopardize the existence
of the crane or destroy its habitat. Even though the Depart-
ment considered the danger of the highway project to the
cranes, the court found that it did not take the steps required
by section 7.13
The court stated that once a federal agency consults the
Department of the Interior under Section 7, it becomes the
responsibility of the agency, not the Interior Department, to
decide whether it has ensured that the endangered species and
its habitat will not be destroyed, and then whether to proceed
with its project. In other words, the Department of the Interior
does not have a "veto over the actions of other federal agencies,
provided that the required consultation has occurred." ' The
agency's decision, however, is subject to judicial review to de-
termine whether it was "based on a consideration of relevant
factors and whether there has been a clear error of judg-
ment.""'3 In this instance the Department of Transportation
was forced to make certain changes to ensure that the habitat
of the crane would not be destroyed or modified." 5
The applicability of section 7 of the Endangered Species
Act was also questioned in Sierra Club v. Froehlke.35 The
11 Id. at 373. The court of appeals reversed the decision of the district court which,
in denying the injunction, had commented that the Department of Transportation had
"adequately considered the effects of this project on the Crane in all phases of its
planning." National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 400 F. Supp. 705,712 (S.D. Miss.
1975). The court of appeals, stating that the lower court misinterpreted section 7,
indicated that the Department of Transportation did not merely have to recognize
the effects of the highway on the cranes but had to ensure that the project would not
have adverse effects on the crane. 529 F.2d at 373.
lu National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, 529 F.2d 359, 371 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
I" Id. at 372 (quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 416 (1971) which applied the Administrative Procedure Act, § 706 for the standard
of review). See notes 155-58 and accompanying text infra on judicial review of agency
action under the Endangered Species Act.
"3 529 F.2d at 375. The modifications which had to be made included the elimina-
tion of a particular interchange and of "borrow pits" (excavated areas) near the high-
way in the critical habitat. The possibility of the Federal Highway Administration
acquiring additional property to replace that which is taken by the highway also was
considered. Id.
" 392 F. Supp. 130 (E.D. Mo. 1975), affl'd, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976). Plaintiff
sought relief against the Army Corps of Engineers under NEPA, Federal Water Pollu-
tion Control Act Amendments of 1972, and the Endangered Species Act, among others.
534 F.2d at 1291.
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Eighth Circuit considered the effect of the Meramec Park Dam
and resulting lake on the Indiana bat, an endangered species.1 31
The plaintiffs argued that further construction of the dam
would "[jeopardize] the continued existence" of the bat and
would result in the destruction or modification of its habitat.'
The court of appeals noted that there are approximately
700,000 Indiana bats, 30,000 of which are found in the Meramec
Basin, and between 10,000 and 15,000 of these would be af-
fected by the proposed dam. 39 The injunction was denied be-
cause the plaintiffs failed "to show that any of the defendant's
present activities in constructing the Meramec Park Reservoir
are adversely affecting Indiana bats in the project area."'' 0 The
court adopted the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in National
Wildlife Federation with respect to the responsibility of each
federal agency to decide whether to carry out its project and
with respect to the standard of judicial review."'
"I The Indiana bat has been on the list of endangered species since 1966. The
Meramec Park Lake Project was first authorized in the Flood Control Act of 1938; the
current project was approved and authorized by Congress in 1966. 534 F.2d at 1297.
See note 58 and accompanying text supra for the application of NEPA to this
controversy.
'" 534 F.2d at 1301. The plaintiffs also contended that the Meramec project vio-
lated section 9 of the Endangered Species Act because the construction of the dam and
subsequent flooding was a "taking" of the Indiana bat by a "person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States." Id. at 1301-02, 1304; see 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B)
(1976). "Taking" is defined to include harassing and harming an endangered species.
Id. § 1532(14). See note 101 and accompanying text supra for a definition of a "taking."
A "person" includes an "instrumentality of the Federal Government." Id. § 1532(8).
The court rejected this argument, finding no evidence to show harassment. "This Act,
as any other, must have a reasonable construction." 534 F.2d at 1304-05.
The court of appeals in Sierra Club v. Froehlke distinguished the situation of
National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, with respect to the designation of the
"critical habitat." The Fish and Wildlife Service had proposed six caves in Missouri
to be included in the Indiana bat's critical habitat, three of which were in the Meramec
River area. Two of the caves, however, would not be flooded by the reservoir, and the
other would be flooded only if the reservoir reached flood stage. At the time of the
court's decision, these caves had not yet been so designated. The habitat of the Missis-
sippi sandhill crane, in contrast, was designated as critical pursuant to an emergency
ruling, implying for the Fifth Circuit a greater threat by government agency action to
the cranes than to the bats. Id. at 1302 n.37.
"1 534 F.2d at 1303. The closing of the dam gates would create a reservoir which
would flood a number of caves where the bats are found.
110 Id. at 1305 (citing 392 F. Supp. at 138).
"' Id. at 1303-05. See notes 133-34 and accompanying text supra for the decision
of the court in National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman on these issues.
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IV. Hill v. TVA AND THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
The process leading to the protection of the snail darter
began when pursuant to Department of the Interior regula-
tions, a petition requesting that the snail darter be listed as an
endangered species was received for review and notice was pub-
lished on March 12, 1975.142 The Department of the Interior,
applying section 4 of the Endangered Species Act, proposed
that the snail darter be listed as an endangered species because
of "the present or threatened destruction . . . of its habitat or
range"'' 3 in the Little Tennessee River. The Department stated
that the construction and operation of the Tellico Dam would
destroy the darter's habitat because it would eliminate the
darter's food source, fresh water snails, which only live in the
flowing river." Public comments were requested.
The TVA, among others, submitted comments, arguing
that no one was certain yet that the snail darter was in fact a
distinct species and also that the TVA was studying means to
conserve the fish. In addition it contended that since the envi-
ronmental consequences of the Tellico project were described
in its environmental impact statement, further consideration
would serve "no worthwhile purpose."'4 5
The Fish and Wildlife Service, however, decided to include
the snail darter on the list of endangered species, effective
November 10, 1975. Rejecting TVA's arguments, it stated
that scientific studies have indicated that the fish is a valid
species and there there has been no evidence that the fish
"2 40 Fed. Reg. 11,618 (1975). The petitioners requested that review be granted
under the emergency provisions of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §
1533(f)(2)(B)(ii) (1976). The Department, stating that the petitioners "presented sub-
stantial evidence," published notice of the petition.
The scientific name for the snail darter is Percina (Imostoma) tanasi, 41 Fed. Reg.
13,927 (1976).
"3 40 Fed. Reg. 25,597 (1975). This action is authorized by 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)
(1976).
', 40 Fed. Reg. 25,597 (1975).
'5 Id. at 47,505. The TVA has transplanted a number of the snail darters to the
Hiwassee River in an attempt to save the species. Hill v. TVA, 419 F. Supp. 753, 757
(E.D. Tenn. 1976), rev'd, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 478
(1977). However, the report of the Comptroller General to Congress stated that a wait
of 5 to 15 years may be necessary in order to determine whether this transplant is
successful. U.S. GEN. AccoUNTINo OFFICE, THE TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY'S TELLICO
DAM PROJECT-CosTs, ALTERNATIVES, AND BENEFITs (1977). This report is discussed in
greater detail infra at notes 210, 226.
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could survive elsewhere. Furthermore, since the TVA's impact
statement was completed before the Endangered Species Act
was passed and before the snail darter was discovered, there
was no evidence that it considered the effect of the dam on this
species. 4 '
Next, the Fish and Wildlife Service proposed that the
"critical habitat" of the snail darter extend from mile 0.5 to
mile seventeen of the Little Tennessee River, the only presently
known range of the species. 4 ' The TVA objected to this deter-
mination, stating that further research needed to be done as to
the darter's habitat.' The Director of the Fish and Wildlife
Service, however, designated these miles a "critical habitat,"
effective May 3, 1976.11 The effect of such a designation is that
all federal agencies must ensure that this habitat is not de-
stroyed or modified.' This designation led to the Sixth Cir-
cuit's injunction prohibiting the TVA from proceeding with the
Tellico project.
A. Extent of Court Discretion in Applying Section 7
The effect of stopping the ninety-million-dollar Tellico
project was considered by the district court in Hill to be an
important factor in determining whether it had discretion to
apply the Endangered Species Act to the controversy. After
concluding that the completion of the dam and creation of the
reservoir would "result in the adverse modification, if not com-
plete destruction, of the snail darter's critical habitat,"'' the
"1 40 Fed. Reg. 47,505-06 (1975). The court of appeals took into account the
interpretation given to the Act by the Department of the Interior (of which the Fish
and Wildlife Service is a division). Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064, 1070 (6th Cir. 1977).
The court cited Udall v. Tallman, 308 U.S. 1, 16 (1964), which stated that courts
generally show "great deference tothe interpretation given the statute by the officers
or agency charged with its administration." Noting comments made by the Fish and
Wildlife Service regarding the establishment of critical habitats, the court concluded
that TVA's action violated section 7 of the Act. 549 F.2d at 1070. The comments made
by the Fish and Wildlife Service are discussed in note 119 supra.
"1 40 Fed. Reg. 58,308 (1975). Again, the Fish and Wildlife Service requested
comments from interested parties.
"1, 41 Fed. Reg. 13,927 (1976). At this time, the snail darter's habitat was found
to be from mile 0.1 to mile 17 of the Little Tennessee River; mile 0.1 to 0.4 is below
the Tellico Dam. Id.
"I' Id. at 13,926-28. The State of Tennessee supported the designation of the snail
darter's "critical habitat." The critical habitat designation for the snail darter is found
at 50 C.F.R. § 17.61 (1976). See 41 Fed. Reg. 41,915 (1976).
' 41 Fed. Reg. 58,310 (1976).
,' 419 F. Supp. at 757.
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district court nevertheless stated that the Act did not apply to
this case because the project was so close to completion. 5 2 Thus
this court felt that it had discretion under the Endangered
Species Act to decide whether or not section 7 applied, in a
manner similar to the application of NEPA. 153 However, the
court of appeals stated that the courts do not have such discre-
tion; if a species comes under the protection of section 7, the
court must apply the Act to the actions of the federal agency.'54
The extent of the court's discretion in applying the Endan-
gered Species Act was considered in National Wildlife Federa-
tion v. Coleman, Sierra Club v. Froehlke, and now in Hill v.
TVA. All of these cases apply the Overton Park15 ]interpreta-
tion of section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act. 156 The
court is to decide whether the agency has acted "within the
scope of [its] authority" 157 and then it shall set aside agency
action which is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or
otherwise not in accordance with law."' 58
In the Hill case, it is arguable that the TVA acted within
the scope of its authority in constructing the dam and in in-
forming Congress of the snail darter problem when it asked for
appropriations.'59 However, the TVA did not act "in accord-
ance with law." The language and legislative history of section
7 show that it must be construed as mandatory, that is, the
TVA "shall" make certain that the critical habitat of the snail
darter is not destroyed. 6 ' Thus the court of appeals, applying
the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, had no
choice but to enjoin further construction of the Tellico Dam.,'
The standard in section 7 is not one of a "good faith effort" at
"' Id. at 763.
' See notes 41-61 and accompanying text supra on the application of NEPA.
,5 549 F.2d at 1074.
' Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1976).
401 U.S. at 416.
'S Id. at 413, 414 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976)). See also Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
I See Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 26, Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir.
1977). See also notes 163-70 and accompanying text infra on congressional appropria-
tions.
,1O See notes 119-27 and accompanying text supra on mandatory language in sec-
tion 7 as seen through its legislative history.
"I See Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064, 1074 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct.
478 (1977).
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compliance as the district court held, but one of "strict compli-
ance."'
B. Effect of Congressional Appropriations on the Application
of the Endangered Species Act
The TVA has argued that because Congress has contin-
ually authorized appropriations for the project with knowledge
of the snail darters, Congress has in effect "ratified] TVA's
interpretation of the Endangered Species Act as it applies to
the Tellico project." '
In United States ex rel. TVA v. Two Tracts of Land"4 the
Sixth Circuit was faced with the issue of whether the TVA had
authority to acquire property by eminent domain under a stat-
ute creating the Land Between the Lakes Project in western
Kentucky. The court, holding that the TVA had such author-
ity, stated that the fact that congressional committees had
appropriated money for the project several times, even though
land owners had objected, indicated that Congress
"demonstrated its intention" that the statute in fact author-
ized the project.6 5
On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit has stated that the
mere fact of Congress authorizing funds for the Tellico project
does not mean that Congress intended to "repeal the NEPA as
"I2 Hill v. TVA, 410 F. Supp. 753, 763 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). See Brief for Plaintiffs-
Appellants at 26, Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977).
The district court in Hill v. TVA approved the statement made by the Eighth
Circuit in Sierra Club v. Froehlke that the Act must have a "reasonable construction."
Hill v. TVA, 419 F. Supp. 753, 760 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). See note 138 supra for "reason-
able construction" of the Endangered Species Act. The court in Froehlke, by that
statement, meant that the "taking" language of section 9 of the Endangered Species
Act did not fit that case based on the fact that few bats would be harmed by the
Meramec Dam. The district court in Hill, however, applied this language to infer that
Congress would not have intended the Act to stop the Tellico project which was 80%
complete.
163 Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 13, Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977).
The TVA states that the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee in fact knew of the
district court's decision in Hill v. TVA when it decided to continue appropriations for
the project. "The Committee does not view the Endangered Species Act as prohibiting
completion of the Tellico project at its advanced stage and directs that this project be
completed as promptly as possible in the public interest." S. REP. No. 960, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 96 (1976), quoted in Brief for Defendant-Appellee, at 12-13.
'" 456 F.2d 264 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
,15 Id. at 267 (quoting TVA v. Kinzer, 142 F.2d 833, 837 (6th Cir. 1944)).
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it applied to the [project]." 6 ' Other courts have similarly held
that congressional appropriations do not repeal the substantive
aspects of applicable laws. In Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Froehlke"67 the Eighth Circuit stated that congressional
appropriations for the Cache River-Bayou DeView Channeliza-
tion Project did not exempt the Corps of Engineers from
complying with NEPA. This "general rule against repeal by
implication" also was articulated in Committee for Nuclear
Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg.18 The plaintiff requested an
injunction to stop the underground nuclear test on Amchitka
Island, Alaska, on the grounds that the Atomic Energy Com-
mission's environmental impact statement did not comply
with NEPA. The District of Columbia Circuit rejected the
commission's contention that congressional authorization for
the test "represented a conclusive determination of the suffi-
ciency of the impact statement." 6 '
Congress, therefore, can appropriate funds for federal pro-
jects while third parties are challenging the validity of the pro-
jects in court. These are not inconsistent acts, but imply that
if the courts hold that the projects are valid, the funds are
available for implementation. Furthermore, as the court of
appeals in Hill v. TVA argues, if a court uses an advisory opin-
ion by Congress to determine the impact of a statute (here the
House Appropriations Committee's interpretation that snail
darters be exempted from protection) Congress would be in-
vading the court's domain. 70
I" Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164, 1182 (6th Cir. 1972).
,,7 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972).
"1 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also West Virginia Div. of Izaak Walton
League of America, Inc. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975).
"1 463 F.2d at 783. Eventually, the court of appeals refused to enjoin the nuclear
test because of the commission's argument of "potential harm to national security and
foreign policy." However, the court did not agree that the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion's impact statement satisfied NEPA. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc.
v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 796, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court, three days later,
also denied plaintiff's request for an injunction, 404 U.S. 917 (1971). Justice Douglas
would have granted the injunction while Justices Brennan and Marshall would have
granted a temporary restraining order pending a court decision on the matter.
" Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064, 1072-73 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 478
(1977). See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 34-37, Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th
Cir. 1977). The Sixth Circuit, in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. TVA, 468 F.2d
1164 (6th Cir. 1972), held that congressional appropriations for the Tellico dam in 1970
and 1971 were not "to be taken as expressing any view with respect to compliance with
NEPA." Id. at 1182.
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C. Application of the Endangered Species Act to Ongoing
Projects
Another issue in Hill v. TVA was whether the Endangered
Species Act applied to projects begun before the Act was
passed. The question becomes more difficult if the projects
were nearing completion or significantly completed at the date
of enactment.
A number of courts have faced analogous issues under
NEPA with varying results. One case that held that NEPA
should not be applied retroactively to an ongoing project is
'Ragland v. Mueller. 17' Plaintiffs in Ragland sought to enjoin
federal and state officials from completing a highway through
a wildlife refuge because the officials did not comply with sec-
tion 102 (2)(C) of NEPA. Sixteen of the twenty affected miles
were already complete. The court stated that "it is simply
unreasonable to assume that Congress intended that at this
point in time, construction should halt, an environmental im-
pact study be made, and the highway possibly be rerouted.' 17 2
A number of cases hold that NEPA does apply to projects
begun before the act was in effect. In Environmental Defense
Fund v. Corps of Engineers the court stated that the NEPA
requirement of an environmental impact statement applied to
the Gillham Dam project in Arkansas which was authorized in
1958 and sixty-three percent complete by September 1, 1970,
one month before the suit was filed.'73 In Sierra Club v.
Callaway74 the court required an environmental impact state-
ment for the Wallisville Project in Texas, which was originally
authorized in 1962 and seventy-two percent complete by the
end of 1971.'17 Also, in Arlington Coalition on Transportation
v. Volpe 7' the court held that NEPA's environmental impact
statement requirement applied to a highway begun before Jan-
1" 460 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1972).
"I Id. at 1198.
,,3 325 F. Supp. 728, 743 (E.D. Ark. 1971). NEPA was passed in 1969. On appeal,
the court held that the environmental impact statement submitted by the Corps of
Engineers satisfied NEPA and permitted further work on the dam to continue. 470
F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
174 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974).
"I Id. at 985-86. See also Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers,
324 F. Supp. 878 (D.D.C. 1971), with respect to the Cross Florida Barge Canal.
176 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972).
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uary 1970 because it "was and is a project ongoing after the
effective date of the Act."177 The court also stated that the stage
of completion of a project is a factor which must be taken into
consideration in determining whether NEPA applies and that
Congress probably did not "intend that all projects ongoing at
the effective date of the Act" require an impact statement.7 8
Finally, the Sixth Circuit in Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. TVA1 71 held that NEPA applied to the ongoing Tellico
project. The court rejected the idea of dividing such a project
into "stages" and of allowing those stages which began before
1970 to be excluded from NEPA.'80 Yet, the court did state that
"this is not to say that the degree of completion of a project is
irrelevant; the amount of completed construction or invest-
ment will certainly affect the ultimate determination whether
modification should be made in the project or whether the
project should be abandoned." '
Because NEPA involves a balancing between expected
economic, social, and health benefits and environmental
harm,' 2 the work done on a particular project, including that
which was completed before the Act was passed, must be taken
into account. The costs of stopping such a project must be
compared with the benefits the project would provide. 83
The TVA, emphasizing the degree of completion of the
Tellico project, has argued that similar standards should apply
to ongoing projects under the Endangered Species Act as were
applied under NEPA. 184 One gets the impression from the TVA
that the importance of the Tellico project, contrasted with the
insignificance of the snail darter, 8 5 is the overriding considera-
tion. However, this philosophy is not compatible with the poli-
17 Id. at 1330. See also Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation
Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dept., 446 F.2d 1013, 1025 (5th Cir. 1971).
, 458 F.2d at 1331.
"' 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972).
'"Id. at 1179.
I Id.
,' See notes 47-48 and accompanying text supra on the balancing test of NEPA.
" Arlington Coalition of Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972).
1' Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 19-21, Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir.
1972).
'I" Id. at 8. This case is "[e]xtreme in the sense of the competing factors-a $100
million project against a 3-inch fish."
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cies of the Endangered Species Act.
The Endangered Species Act does not involve a balancing
between conflicting factors, but requires that federal agencies
carry out their programs in a manner that will not jeopardize
the existence or the critical habitat of an endangered or threat-
ened species.'"6 It can be argued that the Act should be applied
with more force than NEPA to projects started before the act
was passed, including those near completion. The primary fac-
tor is the effect of the project on an endangered or threatened
species, there being the element of finality. If the project is
completed, jeopardizing or destroying the species' critical habi-
tat, such species probably would become extinct in a relatively
short time.
The federal courts of appeals have applied the Endangered
Species Act to ongoing projects. In National Wildlife Federa-
tion v. Coleman the Act was held applicable to a highway
project begun in 1963.187 In Sierra Club v. Froehlke the Eighth
Circuit, holding that the Endangered Species Act did not apply
to the Meramec project first authorized in 1938, based its deci-
sion on evidence that the dam would not affect the critical
habitat of the Indiana bat. By discussing whether sections 7
and 9 applied to the facts presented, the court implied that the
Act could be applied to projects begun before its effective
date. ,"8
Similarly the Sixth Circuit, in Hill v. TVA, distinguished
the applicability of the Endangered Species Act from that of
NEPA for projects substantially completed. 9 The statement of
the court reflects the philosophical differences between the two
acts:
"1 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976). The legislative history of section 7 is discussed in notes
119-27 and accompanying text supra.
,, 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976).
," 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976). Cf. United States v. Cappaert, 508 F.2d 313 (9th
Cir. 1974), in which the Ninth Circuit limited the drilling by underground water users
which was lowering the water table in Devil's Hole, in Death Valley National Monu-
ment, Utah. The limitations were justified under the doctrine of prior appropriations,
the United States Government having reserved the waters since 1952 for the require-
ments of Devil's Hole. The litigation involved an action by the government to limit
the amount of water taken in order to protect the Devil's Hole pupfish, an endangered
species. In this case, the Endangered Species Act was applied to water appropriations
dating from 1952.
1" 549 F.2d 1064, 1071-72 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 478 (1977).
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[A]ny judicial error in a NEPA case is subject to later review
and remedial reversal before permanent damage is done to
the environment. The same cannot be said for an erroneously
granted exemption from the Endangered Species Act. If we
were to err on the side of permissiveness here, and allow TVA
to complete and close the dam as scheduled, the most elo-
quent argument would be of little consequence to an extinct
species. 190
Given the federal government's commitment to the protection
of endangered and threatened species, the application of the
Endangered Species Act to federal projects begun before the
Act was passed, even those substantially completed, can be
considered vital.
D. The Nature of Relief Under the Endangered Species Act
The Act provides for injunctive relief against any "person"
violating the Act or any regulation issued under it."'l Section
11 does not direct whether a party may seek a permanent or
temporary injunction. Rather, the relief sought must be related
to the magnitude of the injury alleged.19 For example, in
National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman, the Fifth Circuit
granted a temporary injunction stopping construction of Inter-
state 10 until certain modifications were made on the highway
project.19
However, in Hill v. TVA, the only way in which the snail
darter can be protected is by a permanent halt to the construc-
tion and operation of the Tellico Dam. Since the district court
I" Id. at 1072. See Wood, supra note 4, at 50,196-97. The author distinguishes the
procedural aspects of NEPA's environmental impact statement with the substantive
emphasis of the Endangered Species Act reflecting federal policy to protect endangered
and threatened species.
"1 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (1976). See text accompanying note 117 supra on
citizens suits under section 1 of the Endangered Species Act.
"I "The historic injunctive process was designed to deter, not to punish. The
essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the Chancellor to do equity and to
mould each decree to the necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than
rigidity has distinguished it." Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944). See also
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Co., 422 U.S. 49 (1975); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,
359 U.S. 500 (1959); and SEC v. Advance Growth Capital Corp., 470 F.2d 40 (7th Cir.
1972).
11 529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976). This case is
discussed in greater detail supra at notes 128-35 and accompanying text.
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found, in effect, that the TVA violated section 7 by not ensur-
ing the continued existence of the snail darter, the court of
appeals held that the lower court had no choice but to grant a
permanent injunction.'94 This result may seem severe, but any
lesser remedy would be ineffective in protecting the critical
habitat of the snail darter.
Injunctive relief with a similarly substantial impact has
been directed in other environmental litigation. In Wilderness
Society v. Morton the District of Columbia Circuit enjoined the
Secretary of the Interior from granting special land use permits
for construction of the Alaska pipeline since such grants would
violate section 28 of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act."15 The
court in Wilderness Society stated that any relief from the
injunction would have to come from Congress, either as an
amendment to the width requirement or as an exception of the
pipeline from the statute."'
The alternative of obtaining relief from the legislative or
executive branches of government is open to the TVA and has
been cited as appropriate action in other litigation. The Fourth
Circuit, in West Virginia Division of Izaak Walton League of
America, Inc. v. Butz,"' addressed the role of the Forest Serv-
ice under the Organic Act of 1897 and stated that "our reading
of the Organic Act will have serious and far-reaching conse-
quences. . . .However, the appropriate forum to resolve this
complex and controversial issue is not the courts but the Con-
gress.""19
This alternative was also recommended in another recent
case involving the Endangered Species Act, Delbay Pharma-
ceuticals, Inc. v. Department of Commerce."' Plaintiff, a drug
1" 549 F.2d 1064, 1074-75 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 478 (1977). Even
though private parties brought the suit, because a federal law is involved, "the stan-
dards of the public interest, not the requirements of private litigation, measure the
propriety and need for injunctive relief." Id. at 1075 (quoting Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S.
321, 331 (1944)).
I's 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The statute required all construction work to
take place within 25 feet of either side of the pipeline.
"I Id. at 847-48. Congress amended the act to allow the Department of the Interior
to grant the permits, allowing construction of the pipeline. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv.
v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 241 (1975).
,97 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975).
"' Id. at 955 (dictum).
409 F. Supp. 637 (D.D.C. 1976).
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manufacturer, sought an injunction to prevent enforcement of
section 9 of the Act which prohibits importing endangered
species into the United States and shipment of such species in
interstate or foreign commerce.10  The Act prevented plaintiff
from importing spermaceti, a substance derived from the
sperm whale, which was used in the production of one of the
plaintiffs drugs. The district court dismissed plaintiffs action,
stating that a hardship under the 1969 act permitting importa-
tion of the spermaceti into the country does not become, by
extension, a permit to sell the project in interstate commerce
under the Endangered Species Act. 0 ' The court said that the
plaintiff should address its problem to Congress rather than to
the courts.202
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in Hill directed the TVA to
seek legislative or administrative relief since the courts have no
choice but to apply the Act as written. "[O]nly Congress or
the Secretary of Interior can properly exempt Tellico from com-
pliance with the Act. The separation of powers doctrine is too
fundamental a thread in our constitutional fabric for us to be
tempted to preempt Congressional action in the name of equity
or expediency. '2 3
E. Alternative Sources of Relief for TVA
1. Legislative Relief
Congress can deal with the Tellico situation by exempting
the dam from section 7 of the Endangered Species Act or by
amending the Act more broadly to exempt certain ongoing pro-
jects from its coverage.2 4
21 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (1976).
21 409 F. Supp. at 637.
2" Id. at 644-45. In another case, United States v. Kepler, 531 F.2d 797 (6th Cir.
1976), Kepler, a Kentuckian, was convicted of violating section 9 of the Endangered
Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(E) and (b). He transported an endangered species
through interstate commerce for a commercial purpose. Kepler had transported a
leopard and a cougar from Florida to Dogpatch Zoo at Flatlick, Kentucky. He also was
cited under state and federal laws for transporting animals without a written permit.
"3 Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064, 1074 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 478
(1977).
2 Another possible means of action would be to seek administrative relief, either
by removal of the snail darter from the list of endangered species or by redefining its
critical habitat. Id. at 1074-75.
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TVA has suggested that the Act should be amended to
make it more flexible by requiring a balancing between the
benefits of any project and the detriment to endangered spec-
ies. Factors which would be considered include "the needs of
man, the importance of the particular project, the importance
of the species, the stage of completion or amount of private or
public funds already in a project."2"5 The TVA's suggestions,
which would make the application of the Endangered Species
Act considerations more similar to those of NEPA, reflect
TVA's concern with developing water and energy resources in
the region under its jurisdiction.
One of the problems with TVA's argument is that the pur-
pose of the Endangered Species Act is to preserve species which
have become endangered primarily because of the encroach-
ment of the products of economic development on their habi-
tats. Although NEPA requires consideration of conflicting ele-
ments, the purpose of the Endangered Species Act precludes
compromising the preservation of species. 2 1
TVA also argues that the importance of the species be
considered when using the balancing test. However, even if
"importance" is defined in economic or health terms, one does
not necessarily know today what the future contribution of a
particular species will be, and if the species is exterminated,
one will never know.2 7 Also, the existence of a greater variety
of plant and animal wildlife for its own sake, rather than just
for its "importance," is a positive value to be encouraged in our
society.2 8
"I ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 481 (July 29, 1977) (statement of Aubrey J. Wagner, TVA
chairman, to Senate Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on Resource Pro-
tection, July 22, 1977). However, S. David Freeman, the newest director of the TVA,
has stated that the Endangered Species Act should not be amended unless there has
been sufficient study. Louisville Courier-Journal, Aug. 17, 1977; § B, at 1, col. 2 (state
ed.). The U.S. Chamber of Commerce also argued before the subcommittee that a
balancing approach should be adopted.
206 The policies behind NEPA include the encouragement of measures which
"create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive
harmony." 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
21 The National Wildlife Federation cites penicillin and the horseshoe crab as
"lowly" species making economic contributions. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERAMION, CON-
SERVATION REPORT, No. 24 at 363 (July 29, 1977).
"I This is the policy of the Endangered Species Act, except that it exempts from
endangered species "pests" of the class Insecta which are an "overwhelming and over-
riding risk to man." 16 U.S.C. § 1532(4) (1976). See note 93 supra on this exclusion
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Perhaps TVA's desire to amend is unnecessary and over-
broad. TVA looks at the impact of the Endangered Species Act
on a large and economically significant project and does not
take into account the numbers of consultations under the Act
which have been resolved without litigation. There have been
an estimated 4,500 such consultations with the Fish and Wild-
life Service since the passage of the Act; of these, all but 124
were resolved informally. Only three cases have actually gone
to court, and only one, Tellico, has gone to Congress. 1° These
data challenge the argument of the TVA that the Act is a
complete bar to the construction of federal projects.
TVA's conduct during the NEPA litigation may present
another barrier to a Congressional amendment. Application of
the Act to the Tellico dam produced a General Accounting
Office (GAO) report criticizing TVA's procedures." '° Evidence
from the Act.
An example of thinking on the question of the importance of a particular species,
in this case the snail darter, comes from an editorial in the Lexington Leader, "A small,
relatively useless fish on a remote river should not stop a major project which will
benefit many people." Lexington Leader, Dec. 1, 1977, § A, at 4, col. 1.
2" NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION, CONSERVATION REPORT, No. 24 at 363 (July 29,
1977).
210 UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE TENNESSEE VALLEY
AUTHORITY'S TELLICO DAM PRoJEcr-CosTs, ALTERNATIVES, AND BENEFITS, (Oct. 14,
1977). [hereinafter cited as GAO REPORT].
The General Accounting Office (GAO) studied the implications of the Tellico Dam
controversy at the request of Congress. It concluded that further studies of alternatives
to the project, including cost-benefit analyses, should be made before Congress acts
on proposed legislation which would exempt the dam from the Endangered Species
Act. Such studies should also be made before Congress grants appropriations to the
project in the event the Supreme Court reverses the decision of the Sixth Circuit. Id.
at 38-39.
The GAO reported that the alternatives considered by the TVA in its environmen-
tal impact statement of 1972 included the construction of the full dam and reservoir,
the erection of low or intermediate dams, or the restoration of the Little Tennessee as
it was before construction began. The only viable alternative for saving the darter
would be to preserve the scenic river since any dam would destroy the darter's habitat.
Id. at 17. Alternative proposals suggested by others include returning all the property
to private owners, establishing a state park and historic sites, or declaring the Little
Tennessee River to be a scenic river. Combinations of these suggestions have been
proposed. Id. at 20.
TVA had spent approximately $103 million of the estimated $116 million cost for
this project by February 1977. The GAO estimated that about $56.3 million of these
costs could provide benefits for any alternative uses in the area. Id. at 5.
The GAO determined that if the Tellico Dam should not be completed, at least
part of the dam must be removed since the dam threatens the survival of the snail
darter. By closing off the north channel of the river, it is preventing the darters from
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of TVA's actions indicates that it continued with the construc-
tion of the dam even after it knew of the existence of possibly
endangered fish species,211 and it requested appropriations after
it knew about the snail darter.212 TVA's behavior has not en-
sured the continued existence of the fish as required by the
Endangered Species Act.
The TVA asserts that the Endangered Species Act "is
being used by some not to protect endangered species, but to
stop projects. 213 There are a number of situations in which the
existence of an endangered species has been used to halt a
federal project. For example, the Furbish lousewort, a rare
snapdragon, was found in Maine at the site of a proposed hy-
droelectric project. 24 Other endangered species found at the
sites of proposed federal projects include shellfish (two types of
mussels) 25 and sturgeon2 ' at a proposed nuclear power plant
in Tennessee, Higgins Eye clams at a dredging site in Minne-
sota,217 and the leopard darter near a dam project in Okla-
homa.2 18 The TVA may have a point that the Act will in some
reaching their spawning areas. Id. at 4. The GAO's report observed: "There is no
feasible compromise. Only completion of the Tellico Project can provide those reservoir
benefits which TVA projected for the area. Likewise, alternatives for the project area
must include removing a portion of the dam to ensure the snail darter's survival in
the Little Tennessee River." Id.
See also NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION REPORT, supra note 207, at 368; NATIONAL
WILDLIFE FEDERATION REPORT No. 26 at 394 (Sept. 9, 1977).
2I See text accompanying note 33 supra on the Little Tennessee River as the likely
habitat for endangered species of fish.
2I Brief for Defendant-Appellee at 14-16 and appendix: A-i, A-2, B-i, B-2, Hill
v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064 (6th Cir. 1977). The question of congressional appropriations is
dealt with at notes 163-70 and accompanying text supra.
213 8 ENvm. REP. (BNA) 481 (July 29, 1977). Another witness at the Senate hear-
ings argued that parties opposing federal projects in the southeast could find enough
"endangered" species to stop all of these projects. Lousville Courier-Journal, July 21,
1977 (state ed.).
214 35 CoNG. QUARTERLY, WEEKLY REPORT 454 (Mar. 12, 1977); Ky. Kernel, Nov. 9,
1976, at 3, col. 3.
21 Louisville Courier-Journal, Feb. 25, 1977, § B, at 2, col. 1 (state ed.). The TVA
reported that the habitat of the mussels would not be threatened if the power plant's
diffuser pipe were moved. However, there is also the problem of the effect of radioactiv-
ity in the area. Id., Feb. 26, 1977, § B, at 3, col. 1 (state ed.).
2" Louisville Courier-Journal, June 4, 1977, § B, at 3, col 1 (state ed.). The fish
were found 20 miles upstream from the proposed plant.
217 Louisville-Courier Journal, Mar. 26, 1977, § A, at 2, col. 2 (state ed.). Work was
temporarily stopped when the clam was found, but the Corps of Engineers resumed
work when no other clam shells were found.
2M CBS Evening News, Mar. 26, 1977. The leopard darter is related to the snail
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
cases be used to stop federal construction, but the rationale of
the opponents of such projects is that endangered species must
be saved.
One bill has been introduced into the House of Represent-
atives which amends section 7 in a matter compatible with
TVA's suggested approach."'9 The bill would add a new subsec-
tion which exempts federal public works projects which were
started before the endangered species affected were published
in the Federal Register. Responsibility would be on the Secre-
tary of the Interior to set up requirements minimizing the ad-
verse effect of such projects on any endangered or threatened
species or critical habitat and to implement any necessary
measures for the protection of such species. 22 Although the
Secretary would be able to minimize the negative effects of
such a project on endangered species, it does not appear that
the Secretary would have the power to completely stop the
project.
Several other bills have been introduced in the House call-
ing for the express exemption of certain projects from the En-
dangered Species Act. One such bill covers the Tellico Dam22 1
and another the Columbia Dam and Reservoir, also in Tennes-
see.212 This technique could create precedents by which mem-
bers of Congress could campaign to decrease the scope of the
applicability of the Endangered Species Act in places where it
might be most necessary, where human activities are the great-
est threat to wildlife.
2. Judicial Relief
In addition to these legislative remedies, the Justice De-
partment has petitioned the United States Supreme Court for
darter. Eighty other types of darters are found in Tennessee. Louisville Courier-
Journal, Apr. 6, 1977, § A, at 14, col. 2 (state ed.).
Several other endangered species affecting federal programs are listed in 35 CONG.
QUARTERLY, WEEKLY REPORT 454 (Mar. 12, 1977).
213 H.R. 4167, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (introduced Mar. 1, 1977).
1 Id. § 7(c)(2).
I' H.R. 4557, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (introduced Mar. 7, 1977).
222 H.R. 5879, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (introduced Mar. 31, 1977).
As of December 23, 1977, none of these bills had been considered at a House
hearing. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION CONSERVATION REPORT. No. 35 at 525 (Dec. 23,
1977).
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a review of the Sixth Circuit decision. 23 Its brief argues that
Congress intended to complete the dam by making appropria-
tions. The Justice Department also argues that projects sub-
stantially completed before the Act was enacted or the affected
endangered species was listed should be excluded from the
Endangered Species Act.214 On November 14, 1977, the Su-
preme Court agreed to hear this case.225
CONCLUSION
The controversy over the snail darter, now well-known be-
cause the threat to the existence of a three-inch fish has man-
aged to prevent the completion of a multi-million dollar dam,
has serious implications for environmental legislation. The
Sixth Circuit, reading section 7 of the Act strictly, has held
that the TVA cannot complete and operate the Tellico Dam.
It has also stated that the resolution of conflicts under this Act
is a matter for Congress or the Interior Department since the
courts do not have much discretion in the interpretation of
such acts. Pressure to change the Endangered Species Act
comes from both legislative and judicial forces.
Congress would be able to exempt the Tellico Dam from
the Endangered Species Act even if the Supreme Court up-
holds the Sixth Circuit decision. However, the GAO's sugges-
tion that congressional consideration be stopped until alterna-
tives to the project are formulated 226 is a reasonable approach.
Besides threatening the survival of the snail darter, completion
of the dam and impounding the reservoir would, according to
the GAO, destroy numerous archaeological sites, flood 16,500
acres of farmland, and destroy stream fishing along the river.
Furthermore, a scenic river would be effective in relieving over-
21 8 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 224-25 (June 10, 1977). The petition for certiorari was filed
May 31, 1977.
24 Id.
= 98 S. Ct. 478 (1977).
22 In considering such alternatives, the GAO insists that the benefit-cost figures
for the project, most recently calculated in 1968, be reanalyzed. GAO REPORT, supra
note 210, at 27. The use of benefit-cost ratios is inappropriate when the initial determi-
nation of whether a project violates the Endangered Species Act is made. The GAO is
arguing that before Congress decides to exempt this project from the requirements of
the Endangered Species Act, TVA's methods of calculating costs and benefits of the
dam should be reviewed. Congress can then compare these new figures with the costs
and benefits of possible alternatives to the dam.
[Vol. 66
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
crowding caused by tourism in the Great Smokies area. 21 In
effect, the GAO report indicates that more than the survival of
the snail darter is involved here. Completion of the Tellico
Dam "would threaten survival of the snail darter, which is
important not only as an endangered species but also for its role
in setting a precedent for future decisions under the Endan-
gered Species Act of 1973.22
Regardless of the GAO's suggestions, congressional relief
presents further difficulties. Legislation specifically exempting
the Tellico Dam from its coverage or the snail darter from its
protection could be interpreted as a sign for certain parties that
their pet projects can be constructed regardless of the Act. Any
piece-by-piece determination would gut the Endangered Spe-
cies Act.
If Congress takes this specific action or makes more gen-
eral amendments such as excluding "substantially completed"
federal projects, it would be saying that the protection of en-
dangered and threatened species, although an important con-
sideration, must be weighed against other factors. The more
flexible approach is no doubt more politically appealing, espe-
cially in the short run. However, one must not forget the long-
term effects which the demise of species will have on our envi-
ronment."' The policy behind the Act is that protection of
endangered and threatened species is a serious government
priority which federal agencies must take into account when
they plan, finance, and develop their building projects. The
protection of such species is not to be weakened by expensive
federal projects or the supposed lack of importance of a partic-
ular species. The legislative history indicates that this protec-
tion is mandatory for government agencies and is not to be
balanced with other considerations as in NEPA.
The Supreme Court will consider the effect of congres-
sional appropriations on the Act and the exclusion of
"substantially completed" federal projects from the Act.230 The
=Id. at 40.
2u Id.
- Any approach which creates exceptions to the Endangered Species Act would
need to provide procedural safeguards to minimize the adverse effects on protected
species or habitats.
See text accompanying note 224 supra on the brief submitted by the Justice
Department.
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TVA is arguing that projects "substantially completed" before
the Endangered Species Act was passed or before the species
is put on the endangered species list should be eliminated from
the Act's protection. One could possibly argue that the practi-
cal effect of excluding "substantially completed" projects
would not be too significant over a period of time. There proba-
bly would not be many such federal projects which were
"substantially completed" by 1973 at which endangered spec-
ies are likely to be found in the future. However, this would not
apply as readily to the alternative, projects "substantially com-
pleted" before the species is placed on the endangered species
list, as this placement could occur at any time in the future.
Any decision to exempt "substantially completed" pro-
jects from the Endangered Species Act could also be construed
to apply to similar projects covered by other federal environ-
mental legislation such as NEPA. Large-scale federal projects
often require years of planning and construction. This factor,
plus a question as to what "substantially completed" means,
could have the effect of exempting a number of projects
begun before the enactment dates of various federal environ-
mental legislation. Also, as new federal environmental acts are
promulgated in the future, such exclusions of ongoing projects
are apt to be incorporated, either into the statute or by court
interpretation, weakening the thrust of environmental legisla-
tion. This would reverse the current trend of federal court deci-
sions which include such ongoing projects under the require-
ments of the Endangered Species Act and NEPA. 3'
The effect of a judicial decision for the TVA would have
the same impact as would Congressional amendments on the
policies behind the Act and on mandatory compliance by fed-
eral agencies. A decision for the TVA would have a significant
impact on other environmental legislation as well as on the fate
of the snail darter.
If the Endangered Species Act is kept intact, its effect
would be to stop the Tellico project. Some alternative to the
dam, including the removal of at least part of the structure,
would have to be determined.2 2 While this effect is clear, the
' See notes 171-90 and accompanying text supra for discussion of these decisions.
2Z2 See note 210 supra for possible alternatives to the dam.
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ramifications for future federal actions must also be consid-
ered.
It is important to remember that the three cases litigated
under section 7 have led to three different results. The Tellico
controversy, in which no revision of the plans could remove the
threat to the snail darter, resulted in a complete halt to the
project. In National Wildlife Federation v. Coleman,13 applica-
tion of the Act meant only that highway plans had to be revised
in order to preserve endangered species. This is certain to be a
viable alternative in a great number of cases. Finally, the
Sierra Club v. Froehlke2 34 court held that a federal project
would be constructed as planned when the project was found
to not jeopardize the endangered species.
Thus, the present Act, as it is now interpreted, would not
necessarily be an absolute prohibition against.federal projects
which encounter endangered or threatened species. The exist-
ence of these protected species in some situations would indeed
halt or relocate proposed projects, but in other cases, recon-
sideration of the plans and some modifications of the project
would be sufficient. In still others, construction could continue
as originally planned. The extremes of the Tellico controversy
are not likely to be repeated in the future, as the identification
of protected species and their habitats will probably occur early
enough to prevent such significant expenditures.
Any court decision or legislative enactment which in effect
excludes the Tellico Dam from the requirements of the Act
would mean the demise of the snail darter. The Act does not
just protect this species of fish but protects numerous other
endangered and threatened species of plants and animals in-
cluding, for example, the well-publicized bald eagle, whooping
crane, California condor, and American alligator. If one species
is excluded from protection by the Act, all species could share
the same fate.
If the Sixth Circuit decision is upheld, this would mean
that the courts must construe the Endangered Species Act ex-
actly as it is written and that federal agencies must act to
529 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976). See notes 128-
35 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of this case.
213 392 F.Supp. 130 (E.D. Mo. 1975), affl'd, 534 F.2d 1289 (8th Cir. 1976). See notes'
136-41 and accompanying text supra for details of this decision.
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protect endangered species and their habitats from threats to
their continued existence.2 35 Any relief foi agencies through
Congress would be a policy decision that the protection in the
Endangered Species Act can be compromised in certain situa-
tions. 36 The Supreme Court should affirm the Sixth Circuit
decision in Hill v. TVA and Congress should not rashly amend
the Endangered Species Act because of the notoriety of the
Tellico controversy.*
Dale Deborah Brodkey
16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976).
21 Congress should consider TVA's action in this controversy before reaching a
decision. See notes 210-12 and accompanying text supra for some of TVA's activities.
* Editor's Note. On June 15, 1978, the United States Supreme Court, in a 6-3
decision, held that the Endangered Species Act protects the snail darter, thus requiring
the TVA to abandon construction on the Tellico Dam. Chief Justice Burger, writing
for the majority, said that congressional intent "was to halt and reverse the trend
toward species extinction, whatever the cost." 46 U.S.L.W. 4681 (U.S. June 13, 1978)
(No. 76-1701). The Court rejected TVA's argument that congressional appropriations
for the dam repealed by implication the Act as it applied to the Tellico Dam. Id. at
4683-84.
Justice Powell, in dissent, felt that the majority had engaged in "an extreme
example of a literalist construction" of the Act and that congressional intent that the
project be completed could be seen through its continuing appropriations. Id. at 4686.
Powell also thought that Congress would amend the Act "to prevent the grave conse-
quences made possible" by the Court's decision. Id. at 4688.
Even before the Supreme Court decision, Congress had begun to consider amend-
ments to the Endangered Species Act. Because appropriations for the Act expire on
September 30, 1978, bills authorizing appropriations for the fiscal years 1979, 1980, and
1981 have been introduced. H.R. 10883, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); S. 2899, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
The Senate bill would also amend Section 8 of the Act (16 U.S.C. § 1536) by
establishing an Endangered Species Committee which would review applications sub-
mitted'by Federal agencies where the agency has determined that an "irresolvable
conflict" exists. S. 2899, § 3.The Committee would have the authority to grant exemp-
tions where it has determined that "there is no reasonable and prudent alternative to
such action; and . . . the project is of national and regional significance; and. . . the
benefits of such action clearly outweigh the benefits of conserving the species or its
critical habitat, and that such action is in the public interest." S. 2899, § 3.
